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Monster	Pets	
Response	by	KAREN	RABER	
 
 WAS BIGFOOT’S SEX SLAVE, blares one headline; LOCH NESS 
MONSTER IS DEAD reads another (and hilariously:  “Dick Cheney is a 
Robot” yet another).1 The Weekly World News, favored repository for tabloid 
accounts of monstrous and imaginary beasts covers Bigfoot, Nessie and 
others with devoted adoration, not least for the numbers their appearance can 
add to circulation. Like the sensationalist accounts of dragons Jan Stirm analyzes, 
tabloid creatures thrill and titillate, fascinate and terrify. Their role is partly 
social—they are “about” the social itself, creating relationships among their 
readers who are “insiders” with special knowledge about the world that others 
do not see. These are monsters with an important purpose, as Jeffrey Jerome 
Cohen points out: the monster’s body is a “cultural body” that emerges only at a 
specific time and place, birthed from cultural patterns, shocks and adaptations 
that require a beast on which anxieties and aspirations can be inscribed.2  
Monsters register unstable boundaries between groups of things that should 
remain divided by category, by species, or other qualities; they “rebuke” 
traditional modes of knowledge, yet warn against certain kinds of exploration. 
“The monster resists capture in the epistemological nets of the erudite.”3  
Here be Stirm’s dragons, then, with their multiple origins in both nature 
and the supernatural, revealing human desires in all their improbable forms; here 
also are Christopher Clary’s witches’ familiars, shapeshifters and skinwalkers like 
The Witch of Edmonton’s Tom, who participate in a world filled with the pitfalls of 
perversion. I want to respond to this cluster of essays on fabulous beasts by 
focusing on the interconnections between Stirm’s clearly marked monsters, and 
Clary’s possibly less obvious ones. Clary wants to move beyond the kind of 
knowledge that has usually derived from exploring liminal creatures, knowledge 
that dead-ends in observing the dismantling of a binary, and seeks instead to 
chart “early modern anxieties about female autonomy and desire, the body’s 
vulnerability, and a wide variety of threatening human-animal relationships.” Yet 
his essay begins by invoking two creatures from Macbeth that are not quite 
identical in origin or connotation. While “paddock” is a type of toad or frog 
(Edward Topsell), “Grimalkin” or “Graymalkin” is, according to the OED, “A 
name given to a cat; hence, a cat, esp. an old she-cat; contemptuously applied to 
a jealous or imperious old woman.” One is a “simple” beast, then, while the 
other is a companion animal.  William Baldwin’s Beware the Cat tells the tale of 
one Grimalkin who swallows up a sheep and a cow stolen by a kern and his boy 
after they murder the animals’ owners, but is then herself killed by the kern when 
she attacks and eats the child. This Grimalkin is also, however, “a witch in a cat’s 
I 
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likeness,” since “Malkin is a woman’s name” according to a member of the 
human audience to the tale.4 Woman and cat, then, overlap as monstrous for 
their exercise of appetite, which seems to clearly signal they are instruments of 
the Devil, and at the same time act as agents of justice and retribution.  
Elsewhere in early modern literature, however, Grimalkin might merely be a 
common name for a “harmless” household cat.5 The full account of cat 
subculture in Beware the Cat, in fact, emphasizes the bond that links household 
pets, in this case kittens, to the shape-shifting cat lady—one tiny “kitling” claws 
to death the kern himself as he narrates his adventure to his wife. If Grimalkin is 
a (shapeshifted human) witch, the kittens who gather news of her death and 
abandon or attack their human companions are clearly ordinary animal 
companions.  The text, in other words, links Grimalkin’s capacity for monstrous 
behavior to every “grimalkin’s” similar potential. 
  Clary is right in calling for an advance on the usual conclusion that 
animals trouble the ontological status of the human and confuse supposed 
boundaries between species. He is right again for pointing to the role of 
embodiment, especially human bodily vulnerability in concocting the attributes 
that define the witch’s familiar.  It is no accident that one of the most common 
memes concerning monstrous beasts in today’s tabloids involves sex and 
reproduction. Monsters pierce the matter that is us; they consume us; they make 
a mockery of histories or schema involving species distinctions altogether. Fear 
of the monster is also desire for it (although what that means for Dick Cheney I 
hesitate to speculate)—desire not just for the monster’s bodily qualities, to either 
possess them or lose oneself in them, but desire also for the kind of knowledge 
the monster seems to promise, the position it occupies outside of the constraints 
of social convention. Baldwin’s tale, after all, revolves around a human, Master 
Streamer, who is willing to dose himself with magical potions to enter the feline 
world. The “grotesque and disordered diversity” of the witches’ cauldron in 
Macbeth, or Elizabeth Sawyer’s description of the “common sink” of men’s 
mouths certainly does, as Clary observes, put the accessibility of women, their 
mobility (both categorical and physical) and their desire at the heart of the 
familiar’s disruptive “disorienting” nature in these plays. But I think singling out 
witches’ familiars as distinct from ordinary household companion creatures may 
create a distinction where there is, for both early moderns and postmoderns, not 
so much of one.  
Others have walked right up to the household pet and observed its 
monstrosity, but have turned away from making a clear statement about it:  in at 
least two of his essays on monsters, for instance, Cohen almost names this link.6 
We are accustomed to thinking of pet-keeping as a positive, even healthy 
undertaking, but early moderns mainly disagreed.7 Those who showered 
attention on mere animals were suspected of being guilty of a number of sins—
from Chaucer’s Prioress, whose misdirected sensitivities and privileged comfort 
is signaled through her love of a lap dog, to Sidney’s Stella, who dotes overmuch 
on her own pet pooch, pets usurp the place of human familiars (understood in 
the root sense of family), but also the resources, emotional and material, that 
should ideally be bestowed on people.8 They draw human focus away from the 
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claims of species kinship. The moral pressure to devalue animals in early 
modernity (and sometimes in postmodernity), I would argue, is also motivated in 
part by the secret fear humans harbor that in fact they are not as worthy of love 
and plenty as non-human creatures might be, an example of what Laurie 
Shannon explores as negative exceptionalism in the case of Shakespeare’s plays, 
but more widely understood and distributed across species than Shannon may 
imagine. Where pets are concerned, we could add to her list of physiological and 
moral attributes that humans lack the capacity to give and accept love without 
conditions and across the abyss of difference.9 Divine injunctions to “love thy 
neighbor” lead to a sense of betrayal felt by those who attend to them when 
those neighbors prove that they are, in fact, not superior to animals, not 
endowed with higher capacities of reason or affection. In a fascinating sixteenth-
century ballad, Great News from Southwark; or The Old Woman’s Legacy to her Cat, the 
original “cat lady” is paradoxically berated for being “covetous” because she 
denies herself food or clothing, and subsists on her neighbors’ charity, all the 
while showering love and food on her pet cat, her “small family,” who grows 
plump as she grows thin.10 When she dies those neighbors find her stash of 1800 
pounds, ultimately “wasted” in a legacy to the beloved animal. Meanwhile the 
balladeer of My Dog and I announces “We write no fights of Dutch or French, / . 
. . / No Monsters, Wonders in the Air,” but only “of my Dog and I.”  The dog, 
the ballad insists, is the perfect companion, joining the speaker in contriving a 
sex-filled “single life” by offering women “from fifteen to fifty” the remedy for 
barrenness or greensickness. At the end of his life, the ballad tells us, we’ll find 
the speaker in the grave “Cheek by jowl my Dog and I.”11 
 Animals fill a need that humans don’t, perhaps that humans can’t. There 
may well be erotic pleasures we can attach to pets that are inexpressible in 
human terms—the pleasures of scent and touch, unimpeded by socially fraught 
meanings. Pets in themselves are necessarily multiple, like Stirm’s dragons, 
assignable to too many categories.  They are human mirrors, assumed to offer 
evidence of our supposed superiority; but they are funhouse mirrors, distorting 
our image, reflecting dimensions of ourselves we aren’t entirely comfortable 
with, as Derrida finds to his chagrin when his little cat peers at his naked body.12  
Pets are at once essential prostheses (no human can hunt mice and rats as well as 
a cat) and completely useless pits of resources (feeding hounds and horses could 
bankrupt an early modern household).  They must be able to turn instantly from 
agents into objects, according to Yi Fu Tuan: “The pet, if it is to find acceptance 
in a well-run household, must learn to be immobile—to be as unobtrusive as a 
piece of furniture.”13 This might sound an overly modern expectation to apply to 
early moderns, but Beware the Cat makes it clear that the various cats and kittens 
Streamer encounters are indeed treated as if they are mere objects, part of the 
environment with no agency of their own. The sheer matter of a pet is malleable:  
through breeding, they become at once more and less than “nature” once made 
them, growing or shrinking, developing particular coloring or anatomical 
qualities. As Stirm oberves, most ecocriticism is occupied with the problem of 
knowing a nature that either withdraws or transforms as we attempt to know it. 
Pets are the material reminder that this is so—they seem to straddle the 
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borderline between wild and domestic, but the more we attempt to know them 
as nature, the more they resemble us, something recent scientific studies keep 
proving over and over.14 And knowing a companion species is an exercise in 
quantum physics:  as soon as we investigate, as soon as we focus our 
epistemological apparatus on that animal, it changes, it becomes something 
other. In the end, all pets are Schrödinger’s cats (existing in multiple states of 
being at once), and all are also Edmonton’s Tom, whose “true” shape is 
unknowable under the layers of corpse clothing that make him what he is. 
Companion animals may occupy the margins of households, but they 
are somehow ambiguously powerful, as Clary’s account of familiars makes clear. 
Where Stirm’s dragons seem distinct from household pets because they are 
distant, “wonderful” creatures onto which are projected human epistemological 
desires that can’t be satisfied, pets appear to allow those same desires exercise 
closer to home. But what if dragon tales also express the unsatisfiable desires 
familiar animals arouse—evidence, for one thing, that we can’t have the 
encounters with non-humans that we wish we could have? To be Bigfoot’s sex 
slave is to be diminished, reduced to sexual object; but also to belong, to have 
possession in the animality that defines Bigfoot. We love our pets because we 
long for union with the nature that they are, and are not.  The poor old cat lady 
of Great News from Southwark keeps nothing of her “belly-money” for herself, but 
she showers her animal with “dainties” so that it is “plump as any doe.”15 The 
ballad turns on the trick that though she treated the cat as a child of her own 
flesh (“Her belly sav’d it for her Cat” repeats the poem) “Puss must show the 
will” to inherit, mocking the animal with its extra-legal status. We know that cat 
ladies disrupt social norms by treating cats as surrogate children; what we often 
fail to ask is why a cat is a preferable recipient of attention and affection to a 
child.  
Monsters, critics are fond of pointing out, are labeled with a term that 
derives from the Latin monstrum for portent or sign.  Fabulous, on the other 
hand, signifies both a product of fabulation or falsehood, but also part of the 
traditional of fables or myths.16 Monstrous and fabulous creatures are thus 
caught up in two intersecting epistemological networks, one that requires reading 
and interpretation to understand a larger dimension of reality, the other that 
hints at the hazards that attend any such effort. Stirm’s and Clary’s fabulous 
monsters invite and perplex because they are both near and far, human and non-
human, boundary crossers and boundary creators. We see them diffusely, 
partially, through a fog, much as we see Bigfoot or Nessie. And what we see is 
always in part only our desire to see, to understand, to “know” both carnally and 
intellectually. 
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Notes 
	
1. I found these online of course, because as an educated intellectual, I have naturally 
never, ever purchased or read a tabloid.   
2. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, “Monster Culture (Seven Theses),” in Monster Theory: Reading 
Culture, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 3-25. 
3. Cohen, “Monster Culture,” 6. 
4. William Baldwin, Beware The Cat, The First English Novel, ed. William Ringler Jr. and 
Michael Flachmann (San Marion: Huntington Library Press, 1988), 20. 
5. The reference to a harmless cat is, of course, to Shylock’s remark about the “harmless 
necessary cat” in The Merchant of Venice (4.1.55); see William Shakespeare, “The Comical History of 
the Merchant of Venice,” in Volume 1 of The Norton Shakespeare, 3rd ed., edited by Stephen 
Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Suzanne Gossett, Jean E. Howard, Katharine Eisaman Maus, Gordon 
McMullan (New York: WW Norton, 2016), 1327-1393. In Bruce Boehrer’s analysis of the play, 
Shylock refuses to take up the position of domesticated pet, rather than wild beast; see “Shylock 
and the Rise of the Household Pet: Thinking Exclusion in The Merchant of Venice,” Shakespeare 
Quarterly 50:2 (1999): 152-70.  But I’m arguing that distinction may be illusory—indeed, if we 
combine Boehrer’s and my positions, it would seem that opting to be a pet would only make 
Shylock a different kind of monster. 
6. See for instance, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, “Postscript: The Promise of Monsters,” 
where Cohen deals extensively with Derrida’s cat, in The Ashgate Research Companion to Monsters and 
the Monstrous, ed. Asa Simon Mittman and Peter J. Dendle (Burlington: Ashgate, 2012), 449-464. 
7. This line of argument about the benefits of pet-keeping appears, for instance, in James 
Serpell’s In the Company of Animals: A Study of Human-Animal Relationships (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). Keith Thomas does observe that the suspicion of pet-keeping was 
changing throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; see Man and the Natural World: 
Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800 (New York: Penguin, 1983), 100-120. 
8. Thomas, Man and the Natural World, notes that James I was accused of loving his dogs 
more than his subjects (103) and Anne Boleyn was so attached to her pet dog that no one wanted 
to tell her of its death (108). 
9. See Laurie Shannon, The Accommodated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 127-73. 
10. See “Great News from Southwark: or, the Old Woman’s Legacy to her Cat,” 
(London, 1695), University of California-Santa Barbara’s English Broadside Ballad Archive, accessed 
February 12, 2016, http://ebba.english.ucsb.edu/ballad/22336/xml. 
11. “My Dog and I,” (London, 1678-80), University of California-Santa Barbara’s English 
Broadside Ballad Archive, accessed February 12, 2016, 
http://ebba.english.ucsb.edu/ballad/21889/image. 
12. Jacques Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet, translated 
by David Willis (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008). See also Cohen, “Postscript.” 
13. Yi-Fu Tuan, Dominance and Affection: The Making of Pets (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2004), 107. 
14. I’m referring to the ever-expanding body of research that confirms that our 
companion animals have been transformed into subtle versions of ourselves, while the non-
domesticated species we examine come more and more to seem as if they always did share human 
qualities and potentialities—dogs and horses, we now recognize, read human emotions in a way 
they can’t possibly do for their own species; meanwhile, wolves have a sense of fair play and 
elephants suffer PTSD.  Either this is the most anthropocentric development in the history of 
science, or we are in the process of discovering exactly how impossible it is to discern something 
called “nature” that is not already shaped either by human material interventions or by human 
epistemological systems. Or both. 
15.  “Great News from Southwark” (London, 1695) 
16. See  "fabulous, adj,” 2v-4a, OED Online, December 2015, Oxford University Press, 
accessed February 17, 2016. 
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